



Consider it DANE

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DNSSEC and DANE?

- DNSSEC authenticates DNS records
 - Secure binding between name and IP
- DANE binds TLS certificates and keys to service names (TLSA record type)
 - Authentic self signed certificates, restrict allowed CA certs, TLS exists in this port...
- Authenticating names, not a trustworthiness assesment – Not replacing CAs then?



State of DANE?

- Resolver side and clients:
 - For HTTPS there is not much application support available
 - For SMTP already an option
 - Others: IPsec, S/MIME, SSHFP
- Authoritative servers:
 - Requires DNSSEC trust chain




Issues?

- Mother should I trust the resolver?
 - Verify that bit!
- New ways to hick up
 - For instance, signzone default expiry 30d
- The security properties of DNS change drastically
- Amplification?
- One root to rule them all?



Certificate Sizes



Do you see a pattern here?

7	6c	65	e.com.gt	.google
c	65	2e	.com.hk.	.google.
5	2e	63	com.iq.	google.c
e	63	6f	om.jm.	oogle.co
3	6f	6d	m.jo.	ogle.com
f	6d	2e	.kh.	gle.com.
d	2e	6c	kw.	le.com.l
e	6c	79	b.	e.com.ly
d	6d	87	google	com mm

